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25 NOV 2003
Expanded
Patriot Act Reach Would Hit The Net, Too
WASHINGTON - A bill approved by Congress last week to extend the
reach of the Patriot Act would expand the FBI's business document
and transaction power to cyberspace stations like eBay, Internet
logs, and Internet service providers, and without requiring a judge's
approval.
It's
part of the new bill's redefinition of the term "financial institution"
and "financial transaction," according to Wired, and allows the
FBI to get such records by handing itself a national security letter
saying those records are relevant to a terrorism investigation.
"The
FBI doesn't need to show probable cause or consult a judge," the
magazine said. "What's more, the target institution is issued a
gag order and kept from revealing the subpoena's existence to anyone,
including the subject of the investigation."
9 NOV 2003
14 NOV 2003
Iraq
War Misinformation Exposed
In
mid-October, former ambassador Joseph Wilson began passing copies
of an embarrassing internal report to reporters across the US. The-Edge
has received copies of this document.
The 56-page investigation
was assembled by USAF Colonel (Ret.) Sam Gardiner. "Truth from
These Podia: Summary of a Study of Strategic Influence, Perception
Management, Strategic Information Warfare and Strategic Psychological
Operations in Gulf II" identifies more than 50 stories about
the Iraq war that were faked by government propaganda artists in
a covert campaign to "market" the military invasion of
Iraq.
Gardiner has credentials.
He has taught at the National War College, the Air War College and
the Naval Warfare College and was a visiting scholar at the Swedish
Defense College.
According to Gardiner,
"It was not bad intelligence" that led to the quagmire
in Iraq, "It was an orchestrated effort [that] began before
the war" that was designed to mislead the public and the world.
Gardiner's research led him to conclude that the US and Britain
had conspired at the highest levels to plant "stories of strategic
influence" that were known to be false.
Defense Secretary
Donald Rumsfeld announced plans to create an Office of Strategic
Influence early in 2002. At the same time British Prime Minister
Tony Blair's Strategy Director Alastair Campbell was setting up
an identical operation in London.
White House critics
were quick to recognize that "strategic influence" was
a euphemism for disinformation. Rumsfeld had proposed establishing
the country's first Ministry of Propaganda.
The criticism
was so severe that the White House backed away from the plan. But
on November 18, several months after the furor had died down, Rumsfeld
arrogantly announced that he had not been deterred. "If you
want to savage this thing, fine: I'll give you the corpse. There's
the name. You can have the name, but I'm gonna keep doing every
single thing that needs to be done -- and I have."
Gardiner's dogged
research identified a long list of stories that passed through Rumsfeld's
propaganda mill. According to Gardiner, "there were over 50
stories manufactured or at least engineered that distorted the picture
of Gulf II for the American and British people." Those stories
include:
The link between
terrorism, Iraq and 9/11
Iraqi agents meeting
with 9/11 hijacker Mohammed Atta
Iraq's possession
of chemical and biological weapons.
Iraq's purchase
of nuclear materials from Niger.
Saddam Hussein's
development of nuclear weapons.
Aluminum tubes
for nuclear weapons
The existence
of Iraqi drones, WMD cluster bombs and Scud missiles.
Iraq's threat
to target the US with cyber warfare attacks.
The rescue of
Pvt. Jessica Lynch.
The surrender
of a 5,000-man Iraqi brigade.
Iraq executing
Coalition POWs.
Iraqi soldiers
dressing in US and UK uniforms to commit atrocities.
The exact location
of WMD facilities
WMDs moved to
Syria.
Every one of these
stories received extensive publicity and helped form indelible public
impressions of the "enemy" and the progress of the invasion.
Every one of these stories was false.
"I know what
I am suggesting is serious. I did not come to these conclusions
lightly," Gardiner admits. "I'm not going to address why
they did it. That's something I don't understand even after all
the research." But the fact remained that "very bright
and even well-intentioned officials found how to control the process
of governance in ways never before possible."
A Battle between
Good and Evil
Gardiner notes
that cocked-up stories about Saddam's WMDs "was only a very
small part of the strategic influence, information operations and
marketing campaign conducted on both sides of the Atlantic."
The "major
thrust" of the campaign, Gardiner explains, was "to make
a conflict with Iraq seem part of a struggle between good and evil.
Terrorism is evil... we are the good guys.
"The second
thrust is what propaganda theorists would call the 'big lie.' The
plan was to connect Iraq with the 9/11 attacks. Make the American
people believe that Saddam Hussein was behind those attacks."
The means for
pushing the message involved: saturating the media with stories,
24/7; staying on message; staying ahead of the news cycle; managing
expectations; and finally, being prepared to "use information
to attack and punish critics."
Audition in Afghanistan
The techniques
that proved so successful in Operation Iraqi Freedom were first
tried out during the campaign to build public support for the US
attack on Afghanistan.
Rumsfeld hired
Rendon Associates, a private PR firm that had been deeply involved
in the first Gulf War. Founder John Rendon (who calls himself an
"information warrior") proudly boasts that he was the
one responsible for providing thousands of US flags for the Kuwaiti
people to wave at TV cameras after their "liberation"
from Iraqi troops in 1991.
The White House
Coalition Information Center was set up by Karen Hughes in November
2001. (In January 2003, the CIC was renamed the Office for Global
Communications.) The CIC hit on a cynical plan to curry favor for
its attack on Afghanistan by highlighting "the plight of women
in Afghanistan." CIC's Jim Wilkinson later called the Afghan
women campaign "the best thing we've done."
Gardiner is quick
with a correction. The campaign "was not about something they
did. It was about a story they created... It was not a program with
specific steps or funding to improve the conditions of women."
The coordination
between the propaganda engines of Washington and London even involved
the respective First Wives. On November 17, 2001, Laura Bush issued
a shocking statement: "Only the terrorists and the Taliban
threaten to pull out women's fingernails for wearing nail polish."
Three days later, a horrified Cherie Blaire told the London media,
"In Afghanistan, if you wear nail polish, you could have your
nails torn out."
Misleading via
Innuendo
Time and again,
US reporters accepted the CIC news leaks without question. Among
the many examples that Gardiner documented was the use of the "anthrax
scare" to promote the administration's pre-existing plan to
attack Iraq.
In both the US
and the UK, "intelligence sources" provided a steady diet
of unsourced allegations to the media to suggest that Iraq and Al
Qaeda terrorists were behind the deadly mailing of anthrax-laden
letters.
It wasn't until
December 18, that the White House confessed that it was "increasingly
looking like" the anthrax came from a US military installation.
The news was released as a White House "paper" instead
of as a more prominent White House "announcement." As
a result, the idea that Iraq or Al Qaeda were behind the anthrax
plot continued to persist. Gardiner believes this was an intentional
part of the propaganda campaign. "If a story supports policy,
even if incorrect, let it stay around."
In a successful
propaganda campaign, Gardiner wrote, "We would have expected
to see the creation [of] stories to sell the policy; we would have
expected to see the same stories used on both sides of the Atlantic.
We saw both. The number of engineered or false stories from US and
UK stories is long."
The US and Britain:
The Axis of Disinformation
Before the coalition
invasion began on March 20, 2003, Washington and London agreed to
call their illegal pre-emptive military aggression an "armed
conflict" and to always reference the Iraqi government as the
"regime." Strategic communications managers in both capitols
issued lists of "guidance" terms to be used in all official
statements. London's 15 Psychological Operations Group paralleled
Washington's Office of Global Communications.
In a departure
from long military tradition, the perception managers even took
over the naming of the war. Military code names were originally
chosen for reasons of security. In modern US warfare, however, military
code names have become "part of the marketing." There
was Operation Nobel Eagle, Operation Valiant Strike, Operation Provide
Comfort, Operation Enduring Freedom, Operation Uphold Democracy
and, finally, Operation Iraqi Freedom.
The "Rescue"
of Jessica Lynch
The Pentagon's
control over the news surrounding the capture and rescue of Pfc.
Jessica Lynch receives a good deal of attention in Gardiner's report.
"From the very beginning it was called an 'ambush'," Gardiner
noted. But, he pointed out, "If you drive a convoy into enemy
lines, turn around and drive back, it's not an ambush. Military
officers who are very careful about how they talk about operations
would normally not be sloppy about describing this kind of event,"
Gardiner complained. "This un-military kind of talk is one
of the reasons I began doing this research."
One of the things
that struck Gardiner as revealing was the fact that, as Newsweek
reported: "as soon as Lynch was in the air, [the Joint Operations
Center] phoned Jim Wilkinson, the top civilian communications aide
to CENTCOM Gen. Tommy Franks."
It struck Gardiner
as inexplicable that the first call after Lynch's rescue would go
to the Director of Strategic Communications, the White House's top
representative on the ground.
On the morning
of April 3, the Pentagon began leaking information on Lynch's rescue
that sought to establish Lynch as "America's new Rambo."
The Washington Post repeated the story it received from the Pentagon:
that Lynch "sustained multiple gunshot wounds" and fought
fiercely and shot several enemy soldier... firing her weapon until
she ran out of ammunition."
Lynch's family
confused the issue by telling the press that their daughter had
not sustained any bullet wounds. Lynch's parents subsequently refused
to talk to the press, explaining that they had been "told not
to talk about it." (Weeks later, the truth emerged. Lynch was
neither stabbed nor shot. She was apparently injured while falling
from her vehicle.)
Rumsfeld and Gen.
Myers let the story stand during an April 3 press conference although
both had been fully briefed on Lynch's true condition.
"Again, we
see the pattern," Gardiner observed. "When the story on
the street supports the message, it will be left there by a non-answer.
The message is more important than the truth. Even Central Command
kept the story alive by not giving out details."
Gardiner saw another
break with procedure. The information on the rescue that was released
to the Post "would have been very highly classified" and
should have been closely guarded. Instead, it was used as a tool
to market the war. "This was a major pattern from the beginning
of the marketing campaign throughout the war," Gardiner wrote.
"It was okay to release classified information if it supported
the message."
Operation TELIC
In
the first days of the invasion, a US Marine Corps spokesman made
a prophetic statement: "The first image of the war will define
the conflict."
The attempts to
control those "first images" were of overriding interest
to the coalition's ministries of propaganda. Because it was believed
that the city of Basrah would quickly fall to the coalition troops,
the "Battle of Basrah" was heavily scripted long before
the first soldiers even entered Iraq.
Marines were given
food packets to hand out to Basrah children. Journalists were to
be bused to the newly captured city and TV crews were to be flown
in to film the "liberated" citizens welcoming coalition
soldiers with smiles and flowers. The UK had expected to lead the
attack on Basrah but, over Blair's objections, the US insisted on
giving this plum assignment to the US Marines. Gardiner's sources
in Britain told him that the sole reason was that the US "wanted
to have their forces lead the victory into Basrah."
When the residents
of Basrah refused to be "liberated," the carefully planned
media event evaporated in a hail of gunfire.
"It was about
image," Gardiner marvels. "So much effort and money on
image."
Salman Pak
In a widely publicized
September 12, 2002 briefing paper entitled, "Decade of Deception,"
the White House described "a highly secret terrorist training
facility in Iraq known as Salman Pak, where both Iraqis and non-Iraqi
Arabs receive training on hijacking planes and trains, planting
explosives in cities, sabotage, and assassinations."
"This facility
became a major part of the strategic influence marketing effort,"
Gardiner writes. Yet, in the invasions aftermath, the Pentgon offered
no "compelling evidence" that such a site existed.
In his February
3 presentation to the United Nations, Secretary of State Colin Powell
flashed a photo of an Ansar al-Salam "poison factory"
in northern Iraq. In September 3, seven months after Powell's presentation,
an Los Angeles Times reporter managed to reach the "poison
factory," which he described as "a small cinderblock building
bearing brown granules and ammonia-like scents." When the Times
had the material tested, the granules turned out to be a commercial
rat poison.
Secretary Powell
claimed that Iraq possessed mobile trucks designed to produce biological
weapons. When invading forces located the trucks it turned out they
were actually designed to produce hydrogen for surveillance balloons
and Iraq had bought the trucks from the Britain.
US Lied about
Attacks on Iraq's Power Grid
When the capital city of Baghdad was blacked out by a power failure
during the April bombardment, Pentagon spokesperson Victoria "Tori"
Clarke rushed to assure the world that "We did not have the
power grid as a target. That was not us."
The facts would
subsequently show that the US had targeted portions of the power
grid. In the North, a special operations team staged an attack on
the Hadithah Dam on April 1 or 2. Human Rights Watch documented
at least two attacks on the power grid south of Baghdad "along
Highway 6 [that] included a Tomahawk [missile] strike using carbon
fibers."
The use of a sophisticated
carbon-fiber weapons is significant since the deployment of these
specialized devices required prior approval from Washington.
Iraq's "Dirty
Bomb"
In June 2002,
an Iraqi expatriate named Khidhir Manza told the Wall Street Journal
that the situation was "ideal for countries like Iraq to train
and support a terrorist operation using radiation weapons."
Manza's interview with the Journal was arranged by the Iraqi National
Congress, a group of Iraqi exiles that was set up by the Rendon
Group and supported financially by agencies of the US government.
(See Weapons of Mass Deception, by John Stauber and Sheldon Rampton.)
Helping to make
Manza's charges more credible, unnamed intelligence officials earlier
had told the International Herald Tribune that "they are kept
awake at night by the prospect of a dirty bomb." Astute readers
will note that these anonymous sources never actually said Iraq
had a dirty bomb. It was all managed through suggestion and innuendo.
American's Heroic
Hostage
In an episode
that recalled the creation of the "Old Shoe, the fictitious
hero concocted by Robert deNiro's ace "perception manager"
in the film "Wag the Dog," Washington's propaganda artists
literally brought someone back from the dead.
Lt. Commander
Scott Speicher had been shot down during the first Gulf War in 1991.
In an attempt to generate sympathy and support for Bush's pre-emptive
war, "intelligence sources" began circulating a bizarre
new story to the US media. In what Gardiner called "a pattern
typical of created stories," these unnamed sources started
a rumor that Commander Speicher had not only survived but that he
had somehow spent the past decade trapped in an Iraqi prison.
Iraqi officials
vehemently denied that they were holding Speicher or, for that matter,
any Americans. When asked about the Iraqi denial at a press conference,
Rumsfeld's response was calculatingly oblique. "I don't believe
much the regime puts out," Rumsfeld stated.
In Gardiner's
estimation, Rumsfeld's answer "was too clever not to have been
formulated to leave the impression that [Speicher] was alive."
Gardiner was troubled
by Rumsfeld's apparent disinterest in the truth but, as a former
military officer, there was another question that bothered Gardiner
even more. "Why didn't [Rumsfeld] consider what he was doing
to Speicher's family?"
On January 11,
2001, Speicher's status was changed from KIA (Killed in Action)
to MIA (Missing in Action). As the invasion forces gathered in the
Middle East, Speicher's status was changed once more, to "captured."
Navy officials who contacted ABC News reported that they had been
pressured to make this change.
In January, "intelligence
officials" continued to leak information to the media that
suggested Speicher was still alive. In April, the secretive ministry
of propaganda leaked a report that his initials had been found on
the wall of a cell in Iraq. Gardiner found this leak particularly
strange since "Military POW recovery personnel are very careful
about releasing information that would cause false hope in families."
The release of such information would also, obviously, endanger
the captives.
Long after Baghdad
fell and the media's attention had been drawn to the fruitless search
for weapons of mass destruction, a reporter thought to ask Rumsfeld
about America's lost hero. The secretary replied vaguely that there
was "nothing turned up thus far that I could elaborate on that
would be appropriate." On July 16, a Washington Times investigation
belatedly concluded that there was "no evidence" Speicher
had survived or had been held captive in Iraq.
Iraq's Planned
Computer Attack on America
An alarming White House paper presented by Paul Wolfowitz before
a meeting of the Council on Foreign Relations warned that Iraqi
engineers were preparing a vast attack on the country's computer
networks.
The warning came
from a single source who claimed that Iraq's Intelligence Service
was working with the Babylon Software Company to break into US computers,
steal documents and spread viruses. There were no such attacks.
There was no such program.
Iraqi Troops in
US Uniforms
On March 7, White House Deputy Director of Communications Jim Wilkinson,
described as "a senior US official," released a story
about Iraq's alleged acquisition of US and UK military uniforms
"identical down to the last detail." Wilkinson claimed
Iraqis in US camouflage were planning to commit battlefield atrocities
to cast discredit on coalition troops.
On March 26, Pentagon
spokesperson Victoria "Tori" Clarke embellished the story.
Clarke told reporters that "we knew they were acquiring uniforms
that looked like US and UK uniforms. And the reporting was ... [that
Saddam Hussein would] give them to the thugs, as I call them, to
go out, carry out reprisals against the Iraqi people, and try to
blame it on coalition forces."
Two days later,
Rumsfeld added a new twist, claiming that Saddam Hussein's troops
planned to don UK an US uniforms "to try to fool regular Iraqi
soldiers into surrendering to them and then execute them as an example
for others."
There were never
any reports of Iraq attempting such stunts. In his report, Gardiner
concludes: "The way it was put by Jim Wilkinson (a name that
keeps appearing in these questionable stories), it seems to fit
a pattern of pre-blaming Iraq. It has the feel of being a created
story."
Iraq's Scud Missiles
In the lead-up to the war, the British and American people were
told repeatedly that Iraq had Scud missiles capable of striking
Israel. When the invasion began, Iraq began to fire what the Pentagon
called "Scud-type missiles." As Gardiner discovered, these
rockets "were not Scuds and we have found no Scuds, but for
three days they kept the story alive."
In October 2002,
a CIA report determined that evidence for the existence of Iraqi
Scuds was inconclusive. Nonetheless, by the time Colin Powell stepped
up to the plate at the UN, the missiles had become an accepted fact
as far as Washington, London and Tel Aviv were concerned.
During the invasion,
"American officials" told the New York Times that "the
sheer tenacity of the Iraqi fight" near a compound at Al Qa'im
had led them to believe that "the Iraqis might be defending
Scud missiles" hidden at the site. Gardiner notes laconically:
"No Scuds or WMDs were found at Al Qa'im."
Saddam's Remote-Controlled
Drones
The CIA's October
report also claimed that Iraq had converted some J-29 jet fighters
to deliver chemical and biological weapons. George W. Bush quickly
seized on this specter for a speech in Cincinnati, where he told
the astonished crowd that Saddam's poison-laden aircraft were capable
of hitting US soil.
By the time Powell
testified before the UN, the threat had been measurably pared down
-- the fighter jets had become smaller, remotely piloted drones.
Mr. Bush went public with the extraordinary claimed that these tiny
drones could strike the US.
On June 15, an
Air Force team in Iraq finally seized the drones. The Los Angeles
Times described them as "five burned and blackened 9-foot-wings."
The Air Force captain in charge of the inspection concluded that
the drones could have been "a student project or maybe a model."
A subsequent investigation
by the USAF determined that the drones' only possible mission was
to take pictures.
Targeting Critics,
Spreading Lies, and PSYOPS
Protesters
in Baghdad lie down in the path of US armored vehicles. The White
House Office of Global Communication is not interested in distributing
photos of ordinary Iraqi citizens nonviolently demonstration against
the US occupation.
The tools of strategic
influence were not only wielded against Saddam Hussein, they were
also turned against foreign allies and domestic critics who dared
to question Bush's agenda. The French were among the first to feel
the sting of these attacks.
Sam Gardiner's
report notes that the French were clearly "the focus of punishment
in the strategic influence campaign." He has identified "at
least eight times when false stories or engineered stories were
aimed at them, the majority appearing after their lack of support
in the UN for US and UK actions."
In September,
government sources informed the New York Times that the French and
German governments had provided Iraq with precision switches that
could be used to produce nuclear weapons. The Times ran the story
before discovering that the France and Germany had both, in fact,
refused to provide the switches.
"American
intelligence sources" told the Washington Postthat the French
possessed illegal strains of smallpox virus. Again, the story was
false.
The Washington
Times received a tip from "US intelligence sources" that
two companies in France had sold equipment to Saddam. The companies
denied the charge and no evidence was ever provided to sustain the
charge.
On April 9, Brig.
Gen. Brooks told the media that his troops had discovered "an
underground storage facility containing... Roland-type air defense
missiles." Lt. Greg Holmes, an army intelligence officer, told
Newsweek that US soldiers had found "51 Roland-2 missiles,
made by a partnership of French and German arms manufacturers."
Holmes also stated that at least one of the Roland missiles "was
manufactured last year."
The story served
to further defame the irascible French but, Gardiner writes with
a touch of sarcasm, the story "was not very well put together"
since it turned out that "the production line for the Roland-2
was shut down in 1993."
Punishing the
French
For the French,
the War of the Leaks was just beginning. On May 6, "US intelligence
officials" were quoted as telling the Washington Times that
"an unknown number of Iraqis who worked for Saddam Hussein's
government were given passports by French officials in Syria."
The story was kept alive by a succession of press leaks attributed
to "State Department and intelligence officials," and
a bevy of "Administration officials."
On May 6, Fox
News reported that "Paris had been colluding with Baghdad before
and during the coalition invasion." On May 7, the Washington
Times, citing reports from "US officials," claimed that
"officials of the Saddam Hussein government... fled Iraq with
French passports."
The French government
angrily denied the allegations and accused Washington of running
a "smear campaign." But when the press confronted Rumsfeld
about these accusations, he "followed pattern." Instead
of confirming or denying the charges against the French, he simply
smiled and said, "I have nothing to add."
As Gardiner sees
it, the intended effect of that kind of non-answer was that "he
wanted people to believe the stories."
This campaign
of Francophobe fibbing eventually contaminated the White House press
briefings. On May 14, a reporter asked White House press officer
Scott McClellan about the stories accusing the French of selling
Iraq arms and issuing passports to fleeing Iraqi officials. "Are
those charges valid?" the reporter asked.
McClellan's response:
"Well, I think that those are questions you can address to
France."
Reporter: On that
point, Scott, do you have any information that the French did, in
fact, issue passports to people so that...."
McClellan: I think
-- no, I think that's a question you need to address to France."
Reporter: Well,
no. It's information the US claims to have.
McClellan: I don't
have anything for you.
"The Secretary
of Defense told us before the war he was going to do strategic influence,"
Gardiner notes wryly. "It appears as if the French were a target."
Targeting Domestic
Critics: The Galloway Forgeries
In Britain, Labor Member of Parliament George Galloway became an
open skeptic of Tony Blair's rhetoric. In a bold attempt to avoid
war, Galloway had gone to Iraq to interview Saddam Hussein in hopes
of promoting a diplomatic resolution to the crisis.
Galloway's skepticism
began to gnaw away at Bush-and-Blair's broad-brush claims that Hussein
was only months away from building a nuclear bomb or that he was
capable of launching a WMD attack within 45 minutes.
Galloway soon
found himself under attack. Government officials leaked a packet
of supposedly "classified documents" to the Daily Telegraph.
The papers, which were represented as having been seized from Iraq's
Foreign Ministry, suggested MP Galloway had accepted "payoffs"
from the Iraqi government.
At he same time,
in the US, a "retired general" contacted the Christian
Science Monitoron April 25, with similar documents showing that
Hussein had given Galloway $10 million.
Galloway's reputation
was seriously sullied. It wasn't until June 20, that the Monitor
disclosed that the "general's" incriminating documents
were forged. The documents released in Britain also turned out to
be forgeries.
The Execution
of Prisoners
At a joint news conference with Mr. Bush at Camp David on March
27, British PM Tony Blair informed the media that the Iraqis had
executed two British prisoners. "If anyone needs any further
evidence of the depravity" of Hussein's reign, Blair suggested,
this was it.
Unfortunately,
further evidence was exactly what Blair lacked. The very next day
the sister of one of the dead soldiers told the Daily Mirrorthat
her brother's colonel "told us he was not executed. We just
can't understand why people are lying."
Pentagon spokesperson
Victoria Clarke also told reporters that the Iraqis had killed "Americans
who had either surrendered or were attempting to surrender."
This report turned out to be "unconfirmed."
A week after the
British press had attacked the "executions" story as a
total fabrication, and Blair's press spokesperson had been forced
to admit that there was no "absolute evidence" to support
the story, George W. Bush told the American Forces Press Service:
"They have executed prisoners of war." Bush repeated the
falsehood on April 5 and Rumsfeld echoed the lie on April 7.
The US press attempted
to catch up to their British counterparts by questioning Rumsfeld
on April 7. As usual, Rumsfeld's defense was the non-answer.
Reporter: Mr.
Secretary, you stated flatly that American POWs have been executed.
On what basis do you make that statement?
Rumsfeld: I think
I said they have executed prisoners of war.
Reporter: Are
you saying that there have not been American prisoners executed
then?
Rumsfeld: I'm
not saying that either. There may very well have been, but I'm not
announcing that, if that's what you're asking... We do know that
they executed a lot of prisoners of war over the years."
The Shula District
Bombing
On March 29, an explosion in an open-air market in Baghdad's Shula
District killed more than 50 Iraqi civilians. The Iraqi government
condemned the attack and blamed it on coalition bombers. US military
spokespersons tried to turn the blame back on Iraq, suggesting that
the civilians were killed by Iraqi artillery or anti-aircraft rockets
that went awry.
British journalist
Robert Fisk reachned the site soon after the massacre and uncovered
a 30-centimeter shard of shrapnel that showed the serial number
of the weapon that caused the massacre. It was a HARM missile built
by the US military contractor Raytheon.
On April 3, CENTCOM
issued a new story claiming to have received "reliable information"
that the Hussein regime was planning to bomb Shiite Muslim neighborhoods
in Baghdad so that it could blame the damage on the US-UK coalition.
"The CENTCOM
cover story came from Jim Wilkinson," Gardiner discovered.
The British, however, refused to support this argument. They continued
to claim (rightly, it now appeared) that no British bombs had caused
the death and devastation in the Shula District.
PSYOPS
There was no better
example of PSYOPS "distorting the free press with false information,"
Gardiner claims, than the alleged surrender of Iraq's 51st Division.
On March 21, Reuters
(citing "defense officials, who asked not to be identified")
reported the stunning news that an entire Iraqi division had surrendered
en mass to US Marines in southern Iraq.
CBS News followed
with a report the next day claiming that "an entire division
of the Iraqi army, numbering 8,000 soldiers, surrendered to coalition
forces." CBS's source: unnamed "Pentagon officials."
The surrender
of the 51st became a major news story that truly seemed to confirm
the Pentagon's predictions of a quick and easy victory. "It
was told as if it were a truth," Gardiner writes. "It
was told on both sides of the Atlantic. It had been coordinated.
It was not true."
The story was
intended to break the fighting will of the Iraqi army. On March
23, reporters from Agence France-Presse and Al-Jazeera TV managed
to reach Col. Khaled al-Hashemi, the commander of the 51st. He replied
in no uncertain terms that he not only had not surrendered but he
would remain in Basrah and "continue to defend the people."
The surrender
of an entire division would have been a powerful blow to the will
of the Iraqi army. The perception managers knew this. It is clear
to Gardiner that this story "was not an intelligence failure.
You would know if you have an entire division" suddenly surrendering.
The story was a PSYOPS hoax.
Other PSYOPS hoaxes
were to follow. Stories were leaked that Hussein had made secret
plans to spirit his family out of Iraq to safety. It was rumored
that Hussein had deposited $3.5 billion in Libyan banks.
The Future: The
OGC, the Roadmap and 'Strategic Fusion'
Perception management
(the art of propaganda, misdirection and lies, if you will) is no
longer discreetly hidden away in some dark wing of the intelligence
or defense establishments: It has become firmly enshrined right
down the hall from the Oval Office.
The Office of
Global Communications (OGC) is centered in the White House. If there
is a Ministry of Propaganda in the Bush administration, the OGC
is it. As Gardiner notes: "The White House is at the center
of the strategic communications process."
The OGC has two
components: One committee deals with conducting the perception of
the war on terrorism while a second committee concentrates on "more
general" propaganda projects.
According to the
Times of London, the exact dispensation of the OGC's $200 million
operating budget is largely a mystery. It is known that the OGC
spent $250,000 on its military pressroom in Doha.
Gardiner discovered
that "at times there were as many as three Brits associated
with the Office of Global Communications. These assets were networked.
To insure the military would be a willing part of the network, three
people from the White House Office of Global Communications were
sent to work with Central Command. Jim Wilkinson became General
Franks' Director of Strategic Communications.
"The war
was handled like a political campaign. Everyone in the message business
was from the political communications community. In London, there
was a parallel organization and a parallel coordination process.
They kept the coordination with secure video teleconferences."
The system worked
well but, as John Rendon revealed at a London conference on July
3, there was still room for improvement. Rendon told his fellow
conferees that the idea of using "embedded journalists"
was quite successful and worked just as they hoped it would from
tests they had run to gauge how reporters would perform once they
bonded with the soldiers in their assigned units.
One of the mistakes,
Rendon said, was that while they had taken command of the story,
they had "lost control of the context." The problem was
the veteran newsmen in the networks: they had "too much control
of context," Rendon complained. "That has to be fixed
for the next war," Rendon declared.
At the same conference,
Captain Gerald Mauer, the Joint Staff Assistant Deputy Director
for Information Operations, observed that public diplomacy and public
affairs are slowly morphing into a single combined information operation.
Mauer envisions a Strategic Fusion Center that "brings everything
together." The Pentagon is already hard at work crafting an
Information Operations Roadmap.
Mauer also told
his fellow perception managers that "We hope to make more use
of Hollywood and Madison Avenue in the future." The overall
goal remains the same Mauer explained: to allow the men who now
control Washington to "disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarial...
decision-making."
Gardiner finds
that the future envisioned by Rendon and Mauer is fundamentally
"frightening." The phrase "adversarial... decision-making
will be disrupted" reportedly was added by Douglas Feith, the
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. What it means, Gardiner warns,
is that "we will even go after friends if they are against
what we are doing or want to do."
Criticism, questioning
and debate are now defined as "adversarial" and the new
watchword out of Washington is: "If you don't agree with us,
you could be the target of an information attack." The new
reality is that "punishment of those who disagree is a dimension
of the strategy."
Gardiner's findings
have not yet received due attention from the US media and with good
cause. Gardiner's investigation revealed that the mainstream media
not only failed to stand up to the government and insist on the
truth, they all too often submitted in complicit cooperation with
the government. Even in peacetime, the corporate media is an "embedded"
media.
Gardiner has some
hard questions for America's press barons:
"How was
it that the Washington Post took classified information on the Jessica
Lynch story and published it just the way the individual leaking
it in the Pentagon wanted?"
"Why did
the New York Times let itself be used by 'intelligence officials'
on stories?"
"Why did
the Washington Times never seem to question a leak they were given?"
"Why were
newspapers in the UK better than those in the US in raising questions
before and during the war?"
Since releasing
his study, Gardiner has had the opportunity to talk with many people
in the print media. While many have appeared "quite interested"
in his findings, Gardiner admits that he has "not heard any
self-criticism from reporters to whom I have talked." In conversations
with TV producers and reporters, Gardiner found the prevailing reaction
was that "the whole story is just too complex to tell."
Gardiner's most
disheartening reaction came during a presentation at "a major
Washington think tank." Most of the Washington veterans in
the audience kept asking, "So, what's new?" And when Gardiner
opined that there was "no passion for truth in those who were
taking us to war," he distinctly heard callous laughter breaking
out among his listeners.
It is the sound
of that brittle laughter that keeps Sam Gardiner going. Things must
be changed. The dragons of information warfare must be slain.
As Gardiner says:
"I pain for our democratic process when I find individuals
not angered at being deceived."
-----
Gar Smith
is Editor Emeritus of Earth Island Journal, Roving Editor at The-Edge
(www.the-edge.org)
and co-founder of Environmentalists Against War (www.envirosagainstwar.org).
9 NOV 2003
Americans
sow seeds of hatred
Former
MI6 Agent: Kelly Murder Was 'Sloppy Work'
A contact of mine,
a former MI6 spook, was speaking about the circumstances of Kelly's
death. He said he's been taught how to "make anything look
like anything" and said that there must have been some kind
of struggle at the scene of Kelly's death.
He said it was
sloppy work that Kelly's body was found with enough pills for an
overdose but hadn't ingested them, he said that should have been
removed from the scene under normal procedure. He added "You
can slit someone's wrists and make it look like suicide easily but
it's a lot harder to make someone swallow tablets." He also
said the heart monitor pads found on Kelly's chest were "simply
there to make sure he was dead." He also said those should
have been removed and suspects the agents involved were disturbed
by someone in the process of the killing.
T.
Dubbs Weblog
Old
News (July 2003)
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